What is Kerberoasting?
In a Kerberoasting attack, adversaries request service tickets (TGS) for accounts with a registered Service Principal Name (SPN) and then try to crack them offline. Because the ticket is encrypted with the service account's password hash, any authenticated user can request it, with no admin rights and little noticeable network activity.
Service accounts often hold broad privileges and rarely change passwords. A cracked service account is therefore frequently a direct path to Domain Admin.
Hardening checklist
1. Use Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)
gMSAs use automatically generated 120-character passwords that rotate every 30 days by default, which makes offline cracking practically hopeless.
2. Fine-grained password policies (FGPP)
For legacy systems that cannot use gMSA, apply dedicated policies with at least 25 characters and regular rotation.
3. Audit SPN registrations regularly
List every user account with an SPN and remove entries that are no longer needed:
Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -like "*"} -Properties ServicePrincipalName
4. Disable weak encryption
Enforce AES for Kerberos and disable RC4 wherever possible. RC4-encrypted tickets are significantly faster to crack.
5. Detect, don't just prevent
Log Event ID 4769 (Kerberos service ticket requested) on all domain controllers and monitor your SIEM for requests using encryption type 0x17 (RC4). A "honey SPN", a decoy account with no real function, adds a highly reliable alert.
Conclusion
Kerberoasting can be largely neutralised with moderate effort. The key is combining strong service-account passwords, modern encryption and targeted monitoring. We are happy to review your Active Directory as part of a security audit.
